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THE EXCLUSIVITY OF THE WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION REMEDY: THE
EMPLOYEE'S RIGHT TO SUE
HIS EMPLOYER IN TORT
JOSEPH A. PAGE *
Then answered him heedful Penelope: ". .. First Heaven in-
spired my mind to set up a great loom within the hall and weave a
robe, fine and exceedingly large; and to the men said 1, 'Young men
who are my suitors, though royal Odysseus now is dead, forbear to
urge my marriage till I complete this robe' . . . Then in the day-
light would I weave at the great web, but in the'night unravel, after
my torch was set."'
INTRODUCTION
Workmen's compensation in the United States has often borne a
remarkable resemblance to the fabled robe of Penelope. Workers,
whom the compensation statutes were intended to benefit, have on dif-
ferent occasions urged the courts both to spin and to unravel the web of
compensation coverage. Although most injured workers seek cash and
medical benefits under the compensation statutes, there are numerous
cases in which the employee actually strives to disassociate his claim
from the act and sue at common law. In these situations, it is the em-
ployer who argues for the application of the compensation act. Many
studies have explored the growth and development of compensation as
a system of dealing with the problem of industrial injuries,' but rela-
tively little heed has been paid to the efforts of these workers to have
their claims adjudicated according to common law principles rather
than under workmen's compensation statutes.' The purpose of the
article is to focus attention on these efforts.
The basic quid pro quo underlying the substitution of workmen's
compensation for common law negligence required that the worker ac-
* A.B. 1955, Harvard College; LL.B. 1958, Harvard Law School; Assistant Editor-in-
Chief, NACCA Law Journal.
The views expressed herein are the author's, and do not necessarily reflect those of the
National Association of Claimants' Counsel of America. The author wishes to thank
Robert H. Joost, Assistant to the Editor, NACCA Law Journal, for his helpful criticisms
of the preliminary draft of this article.
1 Homer's Odyssey, XIX, 123, 137-42, 149-50 (Palmer Transl. 1891).
2 E.g., Brodie, The Adequacy of Workmen's Compensation as Social Insurance: A
Review of Developments and Proposals, 1963 Wis. L. Rev. 57; Horovitz, Workmen's
Compensation: Half Century of Judicial Developments, 41 Neb. L. Rev. 1 (1961).
3 See Schmidt & German, Employers' Misconduct as Affecting the Exclusiveness of
Workmen's Compensation, 18 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 81 (1956) ; Notes, 1959 U. Ill. L.F. 655,
1954 Wash. U.L.Q. 105, 26 Ind. L.J. 280 (1951), 2 Ark. L. Rev. 130 (1948). The more
fundamental issue of whether the worker should have a tort remedy in addition to his
compensation remedy, is discussed in Marcus, Advocating the Rights of the Injured, 61
Mich. L. Rev. 921 (1963), and is not considered herein.
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cept a smaller recovery under the new system, but that all work injuries
be covered regardless of fault. 4 In place of the common law rule requir-
ing the tortfeasor to render full reparation to the injured plaintiff, work-
men's compensation holds the employer liable for cash benefits accord-
ing to the extent of economic disability and limited to a certain percent-
age (usually from fifty per cent to sixty-six per cent) of the worker's pre-
accident wage. However, in addition to the percentage limitation, a
dollar maximum has been imposed on cash benefits. The low levels
of this dollar ceiling prevent most workers from receiving benefits
anywhere near the percentage maximums. 5 Thus, they present
a major bar to the achievement of an equitable correlation between
what the worker has lost and what he receives under workmen's
compensation. For example, in case of permanent total disability,
thirty-eight states have a ceiling of fifty dollars or less.° Death
benefits are likewise limited by ceilings.? Moreover, while it is
generally agreed that medical benefits under workmen's compensation
should be unlimited,° the most recent study reveals that only twenty-
four jurisdictions have compensation acts with no arbitrary limits as to
duration and amount of medical care.° Five states actually cut off
medical benefits at a ceiling of $2,000 or less."
On the other hand, the past half-century has witnessed a marked
shift in the balance of tort law as rules favoring the defendent have been
subject to constant erosion." As a result the probability of settlement or
judgment in damage suits is much greater now than it was when the first
4 General discussions of the history and goals of workmen's compensation may be
found in Cheit, Injury and Recovery in the Course of Employment 10-13 (1961) ;
Horovitz, Injury and Death Under Workmen's Compensation Laws 1-10 (1944) ; 1 Lar-
son, Workmen's Compensation ¢§ 1-5 (1952, Supp. 1962) (hereinafter cited as Larson) ;
Somers & Somers, Workmen's Compensation: Prevention, Insurance, and Rehabilitation of
Occupational Disability 17-37 (1954). See also Brodie, supra note 2.
5 See Skolnik, New Benchmarks in Workmen's Compensation, 25 Social Security Bull.
3, 8-13 (June 1962).
6 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Analysis Of Workmen's Compensation Laws 16 (Jan.
1962, Supp. Jan. 1963).
7 In his comprehensive study of workmen's compensation in the United States, Pro-
fessor Earl F. Cheit arrived at a complex formula representing the median net loss suffered
by the survivors of the victims of fatal industrial accidents. In 1956, this loss, discounted
to present value, amounted to $74,463 in California. Workmen's compensation benefits
under the California statute replaced a mere 12.2% of this loss. On a national level, 33
states replace 20% or less of the estimated loss. See Cheit, supra note 4, at 62-88,
106-09.
8 Id. at 40-42, and authorities cited therein.
U.S. Bureau of Labor Standards, Dep't of Labor, Bull. No. 244, Cheit, Medical
Care under Workmen's Compensation 4-5 (1962).
10 Id. at 9, table 5.
11 "The balance of power between respective advocates has been more nearly re-
stored, and the doctrines so excessively overweighted in defendant's favor during the
1800's in most instances are being more fairly stated and employed." Green, The Thrust
of Tort Law: Part I, The Influence of Environment, 64 W. Va. L. Rev. 1, 19 (1961).
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compensation acts were passed." Moreover, the level of jury verdicts
has risen along with increasing wages, prices and medical costs." A
dramatic example of the gap between common law and workmen's com-
pensation recoveries occurred several years ago. Two workers suffered
similar injuries resulting in the amputations of both legs and the right
arm. One of the victims worked for a railroad in Texas. Thus his remedy
was provided by the Federal Employers' Liability Act under which tort
damages are awarded. A jury returned a verdict of $157,400 (plus an
additional amount for medical expenses), and a reviewing court held
that the verdict was not excessive." His companion in catastrophe was
mangled by machinery at a plant in Minnesota. Covered by workmen's
compensation, he was limited to a cash recovery of $15,000 against his
employer."
The possibility of future legislative improvement brings little com-
fort to the injured worker whose recovery will be based on present-day
statutes. Hence, the worker and his counsel will often seek out supple-
mentary or alternative remedies. For example, a common device em-
ployed in order to recover tort damages for industrial harm is the
institution of a tort action against a third party whose negligence may
have caused claimant's injuries. While the employer is still liable for
workmen's compensation he may recover his payments out of the third-
party award through various procedural devices provided by the acts."
The scope of the worker's third-party rights will depend upon the
language of the particular statute and the attitude of the courts. Ac-
12 Compare Dodd, Administration of Workmen's Compensation 3-11 (1936) (little
chance of recovery for industrial injuries before passage of compensation acts) with
Franklin et al., Accidents, Money and the Law: A Study of the Economics of Personal
Injury Litigation, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 13 (1961) (approximately 84% of all personal
injury claims in New York City result in some recovery for plaintiff).
12 See Belli, The Adequate Award, 39 Calif. L. Rev. 1 (1951). For a discussion of
award trends and a state-by-state tabulation of personal injury verdicts and settlements,
see 4 Bell, Modern Trials §§ 51-202 (1959, Supp. 1961). Listings of recent awards may
be found in 29 NACCA L.J. 409-38 (1963); 28 id. 498-528 (1962). See also Note, 76
Hazy. L. Rev. 355, 356 n.3 (1962).
An important factor in the present level of damage awards is the willingness of
juries in serious cases to allocate substantial sums for non-pecuniary loss such as physical
pain, mental suffering and disability per se. See, e.g., Dagnello v. Long Island R.R. Co.,
289 F.2d 797 (2d Cir. 1961), affirming 193 F. Supp. 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) ($97,000); Seifert
v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 56 Cal. 2d 498, 364 P.2d 337 (1961) ($134,000); Wolfe v.
General Mills, Inc., 35 Misc. 2d 996, 231 N.Y.S.2d 918 (Sup. Ct. 1962) ($240,300). No
benefits are awarded for this element of damage under workmen's compensation. Infra
notes 100, 101.
14 Texas & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Flowers, 336 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
16 Orth v. Shiely Fetter Crushed Stone Co., 258 Minn. 513, 104 N.W.2d .512 (1960).
The employee had previously recovered a $20,000 settlement in a tort action against a
third party whose negligence caused the injury. See 253 Minn. 142, 91 N.W.2d 463
(1958). Thus his total monetary recovery amounted to $35,000.
141 On third-party suits generally, see 2 Larson § 71-77. Se& also McCoid, The
Third Person in the Compensation Picture: A Study of the Liabilities and Rights of
Non-Employers, 37 Tex. L. Rev. 389 (1959).
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cordingly, liberal interpretations of third-party provisions have enabled
employees to recover against co-employees, 17 contractors and subcon-
tractors, 18 and in two notable instances, the employer's compensation
insurance carrier. 10
17 E.g., Allman v. Hanley, 302 F.2d .599 (5th Cir. 1962) (Federal Employees'
Compensation Act) ; Ransom v. Haner, 362 P.2d 282 (Alaska 1961) ; Hockett v. Chap-
man, 69 N.M. 324, 366 P.2d 850 (1961). In jurisdictions where suits against co-employees
are barred by statute, attempts to avoid the prohibition take the form of arguments that
plaintiff-employee's injury was not work-connected, so that the compensation act is in-
applicable and does not protect defendant-employee. E.g., Ferrell v. Beddow, 203 Va.
472, 125 S.E.2d 196 (1962) ; Sjostrom v. Sproule, 34 Ill. App. 2d 338, 181 N.E.2d 379
(1962) ; Bradley v. Frazier, 17 App. Div. 2d 235, 233 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1962). These cases
have not been included in the present discussion.
18 E.g., Butler v. King, 99 N.H. 150, 106 A.2d 385 (1954) (suit by employee of sub-
contractor against general contractor) ; Olsen v. Sharpe, 191 Tenn. 503, 235 S.W.2d 11
(1950) (suit by employee of general contractor against subcontractor). Tort actions
arising from construction site accidents often turn on the exclusivity provisions of the
applicable compensation statute, yet they are generally considered under the category of
third party actions. The intricate web of relationships among contractors, subcontractors
and their employees is beyond the scope of this article. Analyses of the important issues
may be found in 2 Larson § 72.30; McCoid, supra note 16, at 407-25. On construction
site actions generally, see Comment, 29 NACCA L.J. 74 (1963). Also excluded from the
present discussion are the problems arising from tort actions brought by "borrowed"
employees. See I Larson § 48.
10 Fabricius v. Montgomery Elevator Co., No. 44/50905 (Iowa, Apr. 9, 1963) ; Smith v.
American Employers' Ins. Co., 102 N.H. 530, 163 A.2d 564 (1960).
The land mark decision in this interesting area was the Smith case. The New
Hampshire compensation statute allowed third party actions against "some person
other than the employer." N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 281:14 (1955). The court held that
under this clause an injured employee might sue the carrier for failing to discover defects
in a compressed air tank after the carrier had undertaken to make monthly inspections
of the plant. The tank exploded, causing the employee to lose both her legs. As a result
of the decision the New Hampshire Workmen's Compensation Act was amended to bestow
upon compensation insurance carriers the employer's immunity from tort actions. N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 281:14 (Supp. 1961). The Smith case was subsequently settled for
$125,000. See Comment, 29 NACCA L.J. 260, 262 (1963).
Smith was distinguished in Mays v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 211 F. Supp. 541 (E.D.
Pa. 1962), in which the employer's immunity was extended to the compensation insurance
carrier so as to bar a tort action based on the carrier's alleged breach of a duty to inspect
the work premises. In Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 187 N.E.2d 425 (Ill. App.
1963), 18 plaintiffs brought tort actions for personal injuries and wrongful deaths aris-
ing from a construction site accident in which the cable of a hoist broke and the plat-
form on which workers were riding plunged to earth from the sixth floor level. Verdicts
totaling $1,569,400 were returned against the employer's compensation insurance carrier,
which had been charged with a failure to inspect work equipment. On appeal, the judg-
ment was reversed, the court holding that the type of inspection which might have pre-
vented the tragedy was not within the scope of the services gratuitously undertaken by
defendant, and that in any event neither plaintiffs nor the employer had placed any
reliance upon defendant's performance of these services.
The Fabricius case followed Smith and criticized Mays. In holding the carrier as
"person other than the employer" so as to be amenable to a third-party suit, the court
observed: "The inspection undertaken by the insurer was not only for the benefit of the
employees and employer, but also for its own pecuniary interests." As to the argument
that a tort judgment against the carrier would curtail inspections by insurers and dis-
continue the writing of compensation insurance in Iowa, the court replied: "Plaintiffs
answer is, no inspection is better than a negligent one. We are inclined to agree. We rather
doubt that all insurers will leave the field."
Common law suits against carriers for aggravation of injuries during medical treat-
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Additional tort remedies are provided in many of the compensation
acts themselves. A number of statutes permit employees to sue in tort
those employers who fail to comply with compensation coverage require-
ments, and deprive these employers of the common law defenses of con-
tributory fault, assumption of the risk and the fellow-servant rule.'
Specific provisions in many acts give special remedies to illegally em-
ployed minors who suffer work-connected injuries, 2 ' while some statutes
allow employees to collect extra compensation from employers whose
wilful misconduct allegedly brought about the injuries. Others give
workers the right to recover compensation as well as to sue their em-
ployers in tort."
Another method of securing full tort damages in lieu of the limited
benefits under workmen's compensation is to outflank the exclusivity
provisions of the statute, which generally provide that a covered em-
ployee who suffers a personal injury by accident arising out of and in the
course of employment and resulting in disability has no other recourse
against his employer save the compensation remedy." If the worker can
prove that he does not qualify for compensation coverage, it follows that
he can fall back upon his common law right of action against the em-
ployer. Attempts to avoid workmen's compensation may be divided into
two distinct categories. The first grouping contains the intentional tort
cases, where the worker is often allowed his common law remedy even
when compensation coverage is admitted. Here the main issue is one of
justification. The second classification, the action for negligence, pre-
sents a more perplexing problem, for in these cases the web of compensa-
tion coverage must be unraveled. The difficulty is that it is not always
easy to re-spin the threads.
INTENTIONAL TORTS
It has already been pointed out that several compensation acts con-
tain specific provisions covering intentional injuries inflicted by the
employer.24 In the remaining jurisdictions, intentional torts by em-
ment have generally been barred by the compensation statute. Sarber v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co., 23 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1928) ; Schulz v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 125 F. Supp. 411
(E.D. Wash. 1954) ; Noe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 172 Cal. App. 2d 731, 342 P,2d 976
(1959) ; Flood v. Merchants Mut, Ins, Co., 187 A.2d 320 (Md. 1963) ; Penn v. Standard
Acc. Ins. Co., 4 App. Div. 2d 796, 164 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1957) ; Raines v. Pennsylvania
Threshermen & Farmers' Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 391 Pa. 175, 137 A.2d 257 (1958) ; but see
Groves v. Donohue, 118 N.W.2d 65 (Iowa 1962) ; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Watts, 148 Okla. 28,
296 Pac. 977 (1931).
20 See 2 Larson § 67.
21 See 1 id. § 47.52 (a) .
22 See 2 id. §§ 69-70.
23 See Trorovitz, op. cit. supra note 4, at 321-23. The exclusivity provisions are not
always limited to covered injuries. See Note, 40 Minn. L. Rev. 627 (1956). Their applica-
tion to plaintiffs other than the employee is not discussed herein. See 2 Larson § 66.
24 See supra note 22. The most notable of these special provisions is the section in
the Texas act which allows the survivors of an employee killed as a result of the em-
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ployers, even though they arise out of and in the course of employment,
have often been excepted from compensation coverage.
In the assault and battery cases, the majority rule is that the em-
ployee has an option between taking workmen's compensation and suing
in tort.' Two distinct yet complementary approaches have been used to
justify this exception. The first is unabashedly moralistic, and has
evoked some notable judicial prose. "It would be abhorrent to our sense
of justice to hold that an employer may assault his employee and then
compel the injured workman to accept the meagre allowance provided
by the Workmen's Compensation Law."" "[A] n employer cannot cor-
rect and punish with whips the mistakes of his employees committed in
the course of their employment, and protect himself against civil liability
for the results of his assaults under the coverage of our Workmen's
Compensation Act."' The view that compensation is the exclusive
remedy for intentional torts by an employer has been characterized as
"a perversion of the purpose of the act,"" and "a travesty on the use of
the English language.'"° Normally the author of an intentional tort is
subject to punitive or exemplary damages.' If an employer who com-
mits such a tort need pay only workmen's compensation, he has received
a substantial windfall and has also escaped a deterrent against similar
future behavior.
The second approach is that an intentional tort by an employer
is not considered an "accident" within the meaning of the compensation
act." The term "by accident" is one of those litigious phrases which
have been used in attempts to narrow the coverage of the compensation
acts. Nevertheless, most jurisdictions have finally adopted the position
that disability or death intentionally inflicted by a co-employee or a
third person is compensable if the harm arose out of and in the course
of the employment. 32 In intentional tort cases against employers, the
ployer's gross negligence to sue the employer for exemplary damages. See Phillips Oil Co.
v. Linn, 194 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1952).
23 Heskett v. Fisher Laundry & Cleaners Co., 217 Ark. 350, 230 S.W.2d 28 (1950) ;
Conway v. Globin, 105 Cal. App. 2d 495, 233 P.2d 612 (1951); Boek v. Wong Hing, 180
Minn. 470, 231 N.W. 233 (1930) ; DeCoigne v. Ludlum Steel Co., 251 App. Div. 662,
297 N.Y. Supp. 636 (1937). Contra, W. B. Davis & Son v. Ruple, 222 Ma. 52, 130 So.
772 (1930) (dictum); Beck v. Hamann, 263 Wis. 131, 56 N.W.2d 837 (1953) (dictum).
26 Lavin v. Goldberg Bldg, Material Corp., 274 App. Div. 690, 693-94, 87 N.Y.S.2d
90, 93 (1949), appeal denied, 275 App. Div. 865, 89 N.Y.S.2d 523 (1949).
,27 Richardson v. The Fair, Inc., 124 S.W.2d 885, 886 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
as Boek v. Wong Hing, 180 Minn. 470, 471, 231 N.W. 233, 234 (1930).
29 Stewart v. McLellan's Stores Co., 194 S.C. 50, 55, 9 S.E.2d 35, 37 (1940).
3° See McCormick, Damages 81 (1935).
31 DeCoigne v. Ludlum Steel Co., supra note 25; Stewart v. McLellan's Stores Co.,
supra note 30; LePochat v. Pendleton, 187 Misc. 296, 63 N.Y.S.2d 313 (Sup. Ct. 1946),
aff'd, 271 App. Div. 964, 68 N.Y.S.2d 594 (1947); Phelps v. Martin, CCH 1962 Work-
men's Comp. L. Rep. ¶1 3522.
32 Recent cases so holding include: Hall v. Clark, 360 S.W.2d 140 (Ky. 1962);
Williams v. United States Cm. Co., 145 So.2d 592 (La. App. 1962); John Hancock
Trucking Co. v. Walker, 243 Miss, 487, 138 So.2d 478 (1962) ; Meo v. Commercial Can
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courts have nimbly sidestepped this enlightened position by postulating
that the employer in his answer cannot plead that his intentional tort
was an "accident." However, if the employee elected to bring a compen-
sation claim for disability resulting from an intentional tort committed
by the employer, such harm would be viewed as "accidental," and hence
compensable."
Finally, some mention should be made of the case of Rumbolo v.
Erb," in which a tavern employee was assaulted by his employer. A
claim for workmen's compensation was dismissed on the novel ground
that compensation procedures were ill-suited to assault cases because
the latter often involve claim and counterclaim. Under compensation,
the court noted, the employer would be unable to press a counterclaim
that the employee assaulted him Apart from this remarkable bit of
ratiocination, the court also held that an assault does not constitute a
risk of the employment. This approach, which occasionally pops up in
the cases," is incompatible with the generally accepted view that even
the most unforeseeable injuries resulting from risks which could never
have been reasonably contemplated may still be compensable if the
employment in fact exposed the employee to those risks."
The reasonableness of this option can be seen from the nature of
the tort of battery, which concerns itself with the protection of both
the physical integrity of the body and the wholly dignitary interest
that the body be free of offensive contact. 37 If battery cases were com-
pletely excluded from compensation coverage," a badly injured worker
Corp., 76 N.J. Super. 484, 184 A.2d 891 (Law Div. 1962); Mullins v. Tanksleary, 376
P.2d 590 (Okla. 1962) ; Turner v. State Compensation Comm'r, 126 S.E.2d 40 (W. Va.
1962) ; see generally, Horovitz, Assaults and Horseplay under Workmen's Compensation
Laws, 41 Ill. L. Rev. 311 (1946).
33 See Jones v. Jeffreys, 244 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) ; Pawnee Ice Cream
Co. v. Cates, 164 Okla. 48, 22 P.2d 347 (1933).
84 19 N.J. Misc. 311, 20 A.2d 54 (1941).
35 See, e.g., Barnes v. Chrysler Corp., 65 F. Supp. 806 (ND. III. 1946) ; Fowler v.
Southern Wire & Iron, Inc., 104 Ga. App. 401, 122 S.E.2d 157 (1961), rev'd, 217 Ga. 727,
124 S.E.2d 738 (1962).
38 E.g., C. A. Dunham Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 16 Ill. 2d 102, 156 N.E.2d 560
(1959) (death of airplane passenger in "Graham bombing") ; Baran's Case, 336 Mass.
342, 145 N.E.2d 726 (1957) (employee accidentally shot by boys engaged in target practice
in nearby house) ; DeNardis v. Stevens Constr. Co., 38 N.J. 300, 184 A.2d 417 (1962),
affirming 72 N.J. Super. 395, 178 A.2d 354 (1962), affirming 66 N.J. Super. 304, 169 A.2d
232 (L. 1961) (irrational assault by co-worker).
37 1 Harper & James, Torts § 3.2 (1956).
38 A supporting argument for this view (which apparently has never been seriously
urged) is based on the fact that the common law defenses which the employer gave up
as part of the quid pro quo underlying workmen's compensation are applicable only in
negligence actions. See Prosser, Torts §§ 51, 55, 68 (2d ed. 1955). Hence, if intentional
torts are covered by compensation, the employer gave up nothing in return for the ad-
vantage of limited recoveries, while the employee received nothing in return for the
surrender of his common Iaw remedy. On the other hand, workmen's compensation in-
surance has been held to cover cases in which the employer's liability was predicated on
misconduct or illegality. Carmack v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 400 Ill. 93, 78 N.E.2d
507 (1948) (illegally employed minor) ; Stuart v. Spencer Coal Co., 307 Mich. 685, 12
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would have no protection from an employer who turned out to be
judgment proof. On the other hand, if the compensation act was held
to be the exclusive remedy in these cases, the employee would be left
without a remedy for non-disabling, intentionally inflicted harm. This
suggests that if heed is to be given both to the policy inherent in work-
men's compensation legislation that all industrial injuries be compen-
sated, and to the high value that the tort of battery places upon the dig-
nity of the individual, the worker's remedy should depend on the nature
of the harm caused by the battery. But since both types of harm are often
intertwined in assault and battery cases, and since it would be unduly
burdensome to place upon the courts the task of deciding which of the
two remedies is appropriate in a given case, the solution of giving the
employee an option is a practical solution.
Intentional torts which primarily safeguard intangible interests
have been completely excluded from the compensation acts." Harm re-
sulting from these torts can hardly be classified under the term "per-
sonal injury by accident," and only in the rarest instance would such
harm bring about disability compensable under the acts. Hence it is
reasonable to conclude that the compensation acts were never intended
to replace these causes of action.
Employer misconduct, which technically may not constitute an
assault and battery at common law yet evidences the kind of guilt to
which courts have pointed in justification for allowing an employee to
sue his employer in tort for battery, has at times formed the basis for
attempts to avoid the compensation acts. In Southern Wire & Iron,
Inc. v. Fowler," a company president, having failed in his attempt to
learn from an employee the names of other employees who attended a
N.W.2d 443 (1943) (similar) ; Janney v. Fullroe, Inc., 47 N.M. 423, 144 P.2d 145 (1943)
(failure to provide safety devices) ; Georgia Cas. Co. v. Alden Mills, 156 Miss. 853, 127
So. 555 (1930). At common law an intentional tortfeasor may not insure himself against
liability for his wilful or illegal acts. E.g., Isenhart v. General Cas. Co. of America, —
Ore. —, 377 P.2d 26 (1962) ; see generally, McNeely, Illegality as a Factor in Insurance,
41 CoIum. L. Rev. 26 (1941). Therefore, it is arguable that the creation of workmen's
compensation as a system of social insurance contemplated the coverage of intentional
harm.
39 See, e.g., Braman v. Walthall, 215 Ark. 582, 225 S.W.2d 342 (1949) ; Powers v.
Middlesboro Hosp., 258 Ky. 20, 79 S.W.2d 391 (1935). Further support for this position
cames from dicta in two decisions in Massachusetts. Cohen v. Lion Prods. Co., 177 F.
Supp. 486 (D. Mass. 1959), was a suit by decedent-employee's executors against the em-
ployer for, inter (Ilia, intentionally causing emotional distress. Although dismissing the case
on other grounds, Judge Wyzanski stated that the Massachusetts compensation statute did
not prevent plaintiffs from suing because deliberate harassment and annoyance did not
constitute a "personal injury." Reference was made to Madden's Case, 222 Mass. 487,
111 N.E. 379 (1916), which contains dictum that harm from libel, malicious prosecution,
false imprisonment, right of privacy and alienation of affections would not be compensable
because it was not a "personal injury by accident" as contemplated by the compensation
statute. But see Zygmuntowicz v. American Steel & Wire Co. of N.J., 240 Mass. 421, 134
N.E. 385 (1922),
40 217 Ga. 727, 124 S.E.2d 738 (1962), reversing 104 Ga. App. 401, 122 S.E.2d 157
(1961).
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union organizational meeting, knowingly forced the recalcitrant em-
ployee to work with his hands in an acid vat. The employee was un-
aware of the dangerous propensities of the acid. The Georgia Supreme
Court held, inter alia, that on these allegations no assault had been
committed, and therefore the worker's exclusive remedy was under
the compensation statute. This conclusion seems unduly narrow, and
enables an employer to punish employees without the risk of having to
pay a tort judgment. A better approach is that taken by the New York
court which treated the intentional feeding of a poisoned pie to an
employee as a common law assault and battery 41
In a slightly different category, tort actions alleging injuries caused
by the employer's wilful misconduct have met with little success, either
because all such injuries were held to be compensable under the
statute,' or because there was no proof of a specific intent to harm the
employee." Thus, an allegation that an employer had intentionally
and unlawfully removed safety guards from machines operated by
plaintiffs for the purpose of increasing profits and production was held
insufficient to remove plaintiffs' injuries from compensation coverage
in the absence of an allegation that the employer had taken off the
safety guards with a deliberate intent to harm the plaintiffs."
Under those compensation acts which permit employees to collect
compensation and also bring a tort action against the employer if they
can prove that their injuries resulted from a deliberate intent to in-
jure or kill on the part of the employer,' the courts have also refused
to entertain the tort action in the absence of specific proof of the em-
ployer's intent to injure the particular plaintiff." An exception has been
made when the employer's conscious indifference to the physical safety
of his men was so outrageous that an intent to injure could be readily
41 DeCoigne v. Ludlum Steel Co., supra note 25.
42 Pearson v. Rogers Galvanizing Co., 115 Ind. App. 426, 59 N.E.2d 364 (1945) ;
Duncan v. Perry Packing Co., 162 Kan. 79, 174 P.2d 78 (1946) ; Roberts v. Barkiay, 369
P.2d 808 (Okla. 1962) ; Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Reyes, 75 Nev. 212, 337 P.2d 624
(1959).
Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409, 35 N.W.2d 719 (1949) ; Wilkinson v. Achber,
101 N.H. 7, 131 A.2d 51 (1957) ; Cummings v. McCoy, 192 S.C. 469, 7 S.E.2d 222 (1940).
But see Castleberry v. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co., 283 S.W. 141 (Tex. 1926) (dictum).
44 Santiago V. Brill Monfort Co., 10 N.Y.2d 718, 176 N.E.2d 835, 219 N.Y.S.2d 266
(1961) (memorandum decision), affirming 11 App. Div. 2d 1041, 205 N.Y.S.2d 919
(1960), reversing 23 Misc. 2d 309, 201 N.Y.S.2d 167 (Sup. Ct. 1960) ; see also Artonio v.
Hirsch, 3 App. Div. 2c1 939, 163 N.Y.S.2d 489 (1957) (memorandum decision) ; cf.
Keeley v. I.A.C., 55 Cal. 2d 261, 359 P.2d 34 (1961) (knowingly placing employee in
situation of obvious danger and then taking no precaution to protect him held to be
serious and wilful misconduct calling for penalty under statute).
46 2 Larson §1 67-70.
46 Fryman v. Electric Steam Radiator Corp., 277 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. 1955) ; Jenkins v.
Carman Mfg. Co., 79 Ore. 448, 155 Pac. 703 (1916) ; Biggs v. Donovan-Corkery Logging
Co., 185 Wash. 284, 54 P.2d 235 (1936) ; Deithony v. Standard Furniture Co., 119 Wash.
298, 205 Pac. 379 (1922) ; Allen v, Raleigh-Wyo. Mining Co., 117 W. Va. 631, 186 S.E.
612 (1936).
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inferred. In Collins v. Dravo Contracting Co.,47 plaintiff alleged that
the employer wilfully and deliberately allowed decedent to work under
an overhanging bank which the employer obviously knew was about to
collapse. The bank did in fact give way and decedent was buried alive.
The court held that the allegations were sufficient. A similar result has
been reached in the case of an employee shot by a spring gun set by
his employer."
An employer who knows for a fact that if certain conditions are
allowed to exist or if certain changes are put into effect, harm will befall
a particular employee or any one of a group of employees, is certainly
not far removed, in terms of moral blameworthiness, from the boss who
"clobbers" a worker with a baseball bat. A less solicitous attitude by
the courts toward such employers should at least act as a deterrent to
reckless industrial practices.
Perhaps the most difficult issue in the intentional tort cases is
whether and to what extent an employer may be held liable for harm
wilfully inflicted on employees by agents of the employing entity. Hold-
ing the employer vicariously liable for the intentional torts of his agents
under respondeat superior has been criticized on the grounds that the
indignation underlying the moralistic justification for granting an
added remedy to employees in employer assault cases vanishes when it
is not the employer himself who commits the intentional tort. Further-
more, "in all assault cases by one co-employee on another, of which
there are hundreds, you would have only to show that the assailant was
one notch higher on the totem pole than the victim, and the compensa-
tion act would go out the window!'" On the other hand, this position
in effect insulates corporate employers from intentional tort actions
brought by employees.
It is submitted that the courts in dealing with this problem have
taken a more flexible and equitable approach. For example, consider that
one such use of respondeat superior is to hold a master liable for torts
resulting from wrongful means employed by a servant to further the
master's business." Consequently, though it may be undesirable to
allow suits against the employing entity whenever the assailant's posi-
tion is merely "one notch higher" in the employment structure than
that of the victim even if the assault was intended to promote the
47 114 W. Va. 229, 171 S.E. 757 (1933).
48 Weis v. Allen, 147 Ore. 670, 35 P.2d 478 (1934).
48 2 Larson § 68.23. See also Schmidt & German, supra note 3, at 91; Note, 13
Vand. L. Rev. 523, 527 (1960). Suits based on the employer's negligence in hiring or re-
taining a dangerous co-employee who assaulted plaintiff-employee have been, of course,
rejected because of the exclusivity of the compensation remedy. E.g., Durso v. Modern
Biscuit Corp., 11 App. Div. 2d 1036, 205 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1960). But see Champlin .v.
Chemical Corn Exch. Bank, 158 N.Y.S.2d 138 (Sup. Ct. 1956) ; Wolfson v. Gershunoff, 277
App. Div. 1149, 101 N.Y.S.2d 411 (1950).
50 Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Stockton, 171 Miss, 209, 157 So. 366 (1934).
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employer's business, nevertheless, the solution some courts have
adopted is not to bar all such suits, but rather to allow the action when
there is a substantial identification between the assailant and the em-
ployer. Thus, in Garcia v. Gusmack Restaurant Corp.,' the assailant
was the president and operator of a bar and grill. The employee was
permitted to sue the corporate entity in tort since there was little actual
difference between the assailant and the defendant. So too, an assault
by a general manager has been imputed to a corporate employer. 52 How-
ever, note the distinction drawn by the South Carolina Supreme Court,
which has allowed a tort action against a corporate employer when the
assailant was a corporation manager," yet held that the compensation
act was exclusive when a mere foreman inflicted the injuries." On the
other hand, in several cases there is language indicating that wilful
harm inflicted by a supervisory employee such as a foreman may be
imputed to the corporation but only if the conduct resulting in the harm
had been instigated or authorized by the employer." Again, it would
seem that such instigation or authorization might come from a corpor-
ate official. The rigidity of the view that intentional tort actions may be
entertained only when the employer is an individual can produce results
such as the refusal of the court in the Fowler case to impute to the
corporate employer harm intentionally inflicted by the company presi-
dent in furtherance of an anti-union policy."
A second example of the use of respondeat superior in intentional
tort cases is the rule that the torts incident to a custodial job where the
use of force is a natural incident will be imputed to the master."
Several tort actions by employees against employers illustrate this
principle. In Barnes v. Chrysler Corp.," employees who were assaulted
51 150 N.Y.S.2d 232 (City Ct. 1954).
52 Heskett v. Fisher Laundry & Cleaners Co., supra note 25. But see Echolds v.
Chattooga Mercantile Co., 74 Ga. App. 18, 38 S.E.2d 675 (1946) ; McLaughlin v.
Thompson, Boland & Lee, 72 Ga. App. 564, 34 S.E.2d 562 (1945) ; Zygmuntowicz v.
American Steel & Wire Co., supra note 39.
53 Stewart v. McLellan's Stores Co., supra note 29.
51 Thompson v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 199 S.C. 304, 19 S.E.2d 226 (1942) ; cf.
DeCoigne v. Ludlum Steel Co., supra note 25 (foreman as "officer"). In Thayer's Case,
— Mass. —, 185 N.E.2d 292 (Mass. 1962), a provision in the compensation act allowing
an employee to collect double compensation if his injuries resulted from the "serious and
wilful misconduct" of a corporate agent "exercising the powers of superintendence" was
held applicable to the misdeeds of a foreman. For cases awarding compensation to subor-
dinate employees assaulted by their superiors, see 17 Negl. & Comp. Cas. Ann. (n.s.) 48,
84-91 (1945). Cf. Ransom v. Haner, 362 P.2d 282 (Alaska 1961) (supervisor as co-
employee amenable to third party action).
55 See Whittington v. Moore McCormack Lines, 196 F.2d 295 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 865 (1952) ; McGrew v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., — Mont. —, " 377
P.2d 350 (1963) ; cf. Richardson v. The Fair, Inc., supra note 27.
50 Southern Wire & Iron, Inc. v. Fowler, supra note 40. The decision is criticized in
Feild, Workmen's Compensation (Annual Survey of Ga. Law), 14 Mercer L. Rev. 244,
259-61 (1962).
51 Chuck's Bar v. Wallace, 198 Okla. 152, 176 P.2d 484 (1946).
58 65 F. Supp. 806 (N.D. Ill. 1946).
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and imprisoned by company guards as they were about to present work
grievances to defendant's management were allowed to sue the corpora-
tion in tort. The court distinguished cases involving assaults by co-
employees or foremen on the ground that they arose from normal job
frictions. The same result has been reached in a Georgia case in which
a supervisory employee accused a saleslady of stealing, and confined
her in the basement of the store for five hours." On the other hand,
some early cases have held such injuries covered by the compensation
statute!'" The employer, by creating jobs which may involve the in-
tentional use of force, exposes himself to much of the same moral in-
dignation used to justify tort actions when he personally inflicted the
intentional harm. Also, since a very limited number of employees are
ordinarily charged with duties in which the use of force is inherent,
there is little risk of a multiplicity of tort actions undermining the com-
pensation act. Hence, it seems justifiable to allow tort actions in these
cases.
A somewhat different type of intentional harm an employer may
inflict results from deceit or misrepresentation. In Flamm v. Bethlehem
Steel Co.," plaintiff's allegation that he was deprived of compensation
benefits through the conspiratorial submission of a false medical report
by his employer and a doctor was held to state a good cause of action.
The court reasoned that the exclusivity provisions of the applicable
compensation statute (the federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Work-
ers' Compensation Act) did not apply to a fraud perpetrated two years
after the work-connected injury." Plaintiff's measure of damages was
the value of what he lost, i.e., his compensation benefits.
Vicarious liability plays a role here also, for the Seventh Circuit has
gone so far as to allow a tort action against an employer who did not
participate in the deceit." In that case the fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion of a company doctor who knew plaintiff's hip had been broken but
gave him a clean bill of health was imputed to the employer under
respondeat superior.
A common feature in these cases is that at the time of the suit,
plaintiff was barred from seeking workmen's compensation because of
the statute of limitations. Therefore, to maintain the suit the employee
53 Smith v. Rich's Inc., 104 Ga. App. 883, 123 S.E.2d 316 (1961).
69 Distephano v. Standard Shipbuilding Corp., 203 App. Div. 145, 196 N.Y. Supp.
452 (1922) (special police officer) ; Atolia Mining Co. v. I.A.C., 175 Cal. 691, 167 Pac. 148
(1917) (guard).
61 18 Misc. 2d. 154, 185 N.Y.S.2d 136 (Sup. Ct. 1959), aff'd, 10 App. Div. 2d 881,
202 N.Y.S.2d 222 (1960) (memorandum decision).
92 See also Clark v. Ames, 144 Kan. 115, 58 P.2d 81 (1936) (dictum). Contra,
Greenwalt v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 164 Ohio St. 1, 128 N.E.2d 116 (1955), noted,
40 Minn. L. Rev. 627 (1956).
53 Woodburn v. Standard Forgings Corp., 112 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1940) ; cf. . Ivanhoe
v. Buda Co., 247 Ill. App. 336 (1928), 251 Ill. App. 192 (1929).
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must show that within the statutory period, the employer's deceit kept
him from obtaining compensation benefits.° 4 The justification for per-
mitting these suits is that otherwise the worker would have no remedy
for his employment-connected injury.
Actually, a tidier solution would be to allow the worker to file for
compensation, and hold that the employer was estopped from pleading
the tardiness of the claim. In this way, the employee would lose nothing
since his tort damages would be no more than his compensation benefits.
Further he would retain certain of the advantages of workmen's com-
pensation such as the possibility of reopening the claim in the event his
condition should thereafter change for the worse.
If, however, the employer's deceit or intentional misrepresentation
actually results in the infliction of a physical injury upon the employee
or causes the employee to suffer the aggravation of an existing injury,
the reasoning used to justify tort actions against employers in assault
and battery cases would appear to be applicable. However compelling
this argument may be, the statute may still present an obstacle. Thus,
in Buttner v. American Bell Tel. Co.," a California court dismissed an
employee's deceit action against the employer for the latter's inten-
tional misstatement of the nature of carbon tetrachloride, which mis-
representation caused the employee to be injured, since the California
Labor Code specifically provided for increased compensation for in-
juries arising from an employer's wilful misconduct. 'While the basis of
the decision may appear somewhat acceptable, it is arguable that a
deceit action for full compensatory damages should lie when an em-
ployer intentionally fails to inform an employee of a hidden injury or
disease and further harm results. Nevertheless, a decision from the
Ninth Circuit barred a tort action (against the employer's compensa-
tion insurance carrier) on these facts." The court held that the aggra-
vation was covered under the compensation act.
64 Consider the case of Ragsdale v. Watson, 201 F. Supp. 495 (WD. Ark. 1962),
where the court dismissed a tort action by an injured employee against the employer's
compensation insurance carrier, its agents and the treating physicians for conspiring to
defraud plaintiff by intentionally submitting false and misleading medical reports at a
compensation proceeding in which plaintiff was denied recovery. Plaintiff, though he
knew of the fraud, had failed to bring it up during the compensation proceeding nor
appeal the commission's finding to the circuit court. Cf. Dunn v. Travelers Ins. Co., 362
S.W.2d 412 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
65 41 Cal. App. 581, 107 P.2d 439 (1940).
06 Sarber v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 23 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1928). See also Bevis v.
Armco Steel Corp., 86 Ohio App. 525, 93 N.E.2d 33 (1949), appeal dismissed per curiam,
153 Ohio St. 366, 91 N.E.2d 479, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 810 (1950), in which the worker
alleged that his employer intentionally misrepresented the results of a medical examina-
tion which indicated that the worker had contracted silicosis. A tort action based on the
aggravation of the silicosis was dismissed. See Note, 40 Minn. L. Rev. 627 (1956).
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NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS
Thus far we have considered harm intentionally inflicted by an
employer. However, assume the injured worker can point to mere neg-
ligent conduct on the part of the employer as the cause of his woe. Here
it would seem that the employee should be barred from recovery at
common law, for the workmen's compensation acts were designed to
cover all work injuries. Thus, the employer, his agents or a third
party may be at fault, the employee may bring on the harm through
his own carelessness, or the injury may derive from the pure workings
of fate without any human intervention. So long as the harm falls
within the statutory terms, the compensation act will furnish an ex-
clusive remedy.
The rub lies in the interpretation of the statutory terms. It is
universally conceded that workmen's compensation does not purport to
be general accident and health insurance. 67 Yet one of its greatest
weaknesses as a piece of social legislation, limited to industrial disabil-
ity, has been its failure to delineate the area of coverage with clear and
unequivocally definitive language. Countless battles have been fought
around the fringes of the phrase "personal injury by accident arising
out of and in the course of employment, and resulting in disability."
Employers and insurers alike have labored mightily for strict con-
struction, while employees have sought a broad interpretation ° 8 As a
result, employees in many instances have found it profitable to take
advantage of narrow interpretations successfully urged by employers,
and to revert to their common law remedies.
A frequent example of this occurs in the contraction of disease
cases where the worker sues in tort. Both judicial decisions and restric-
tive statutory language have at times placed diseases (both infectious
and occupational) beyond the ambit of the term "personal injury by
accident."°° In these jurisdictions employees stricken with such dis-
eases have been permitted to recover in tort from their employers, if
the latter could be proved negligent." The problem here is basically
legislative in nature, and can best be solved by including all work-
connected diseases within the meaning of accidental injury.
Damage to artificial parts of the body has also been excluded from
67 For a discussion of the reasons for maintaining a separate system for compensating
industrial injuries, see Cheit, op. cit. supra note 4, at 144-46.
ns See generally, Brodie, op. cit. supra note 2.
06 See I Larson §* 40-41.
76 Compare Joyce v. Luse-Stevenson Co., 346 Mo. 58, 139 S.W.2d 918 (1940)
(lobar pneumonia not an accident; compensation claim denied) with McDaniel v.
Kerr, 364 Mo. 1, 258 S.W.2d 629 (1953) (lung abscess not an accident; tort action against
employer permitted). See also Smith v. Garside, 76 Nev. 377, 355 P.2d 849 (1960) ;
Muir v. Neisner Bros., 6 D. & C.2d 581 (Pa. C.P. 1955) ; Annot., 100 A.L.R. 519
(1936), supplemented, 121 A.L.R. 1143 (1939).
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coverage under the term "personal injury."' Apart from the merits of
this "island of immunity,"" it would seem clear that if, for example, a
prosthesis is damaged but no injury to the body is suffered, the em-
ployee ought to be permitted to sue the employer in tort for property
damage." Similarly, an employee in New York should be able to bring
a tort action against his employer for emotional harm precipitated by
negligently inflicted emotional stress. The decisional law of that state
has reached the anomalous point of allowing a negligence action but
denying a compensation claim for this particular type of harm. 74
One of the difficulties stemming from the phrase "arising out of"
is the extent to which the consequences of an industrial injury should
be compensable. The general rule which has emerged is that the aggra-
vation of a work injury or the causation of a new and distinct injury
is compensable if it is the direct and natural result of the original in-
jury." Thus, an employee who was forced to walk with a crutch be-
cause of a work-connected injury and who subsequently broke his left
hip in a fall when the crutch slipped was allowed to recover compensa-
tion for the new injury." This principle was used to bar a tort action
by an employee against his employer when the former was injured at
work and then was further injured when the ambulance which the
employer furnished to take the employee to the hospital was involved
in a traffic accident." The second injury was held compensable.
If the industrial injury is aggravated because of negligent treat-
ment by the employer's (or carrier's) doctor or nurse, again the rule is
that the worsened condition is a compensable consequence of the orig-
inal injury, so that a tort action against the employer will be barred."
One noteworthy exception is the California case in which a nurse who
71 See 1 Larson § 42.12. But see Agostinho v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp.,
177 A,2d 630 (R.I. 1962).
72 See Comment, 29 NACCA L.J. 256 (1963).
73 Cf. Frontier Theatres, Inc. v. Brown, 362 S.W.2d 360 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962)
(dictum).
74 Compare Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34
(1961) with Chcrnin v. Progress Serv. Co., 9 N.Y.2d 880, 175 N.E,2d 827, 216 N.Y.S.2d
697 (1961).
75 1 Larson § 13.11.
73 Chiodo v. Newhall Co., 254 N.Y. 534, 173 N.E. 854 (1930).
77 Governair Corp. v. District Court of Okla. County, 293 P.2d 918 (Okla. 1956).
78 Lindsay v. George Washington Univ., 279 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Rickman
v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 157 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1946) (worker choked and
beaten by nurse in employer's hospital; tort action barred, but court took no position
whether worsened condition compensabIe); Mohr v. United States, 184 F. Supp. 80
(ND. Cal. 1960) ; Berry v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 317 (D. Ore. 1957) ; Nall v.
Alabama Util. Co., 224 Ala. 33, 138 So. 411 (1931) ; Deauville v. Hall, 188 Cal. App. 2d
585, 10 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1961) ; Parchefsky v. Kroll Bros., 267 N.Y. 410, 196 N.E. 308
(1935); Young v. International Paper Co., 282 App. Div. 750, 122 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1953).
Contra, Vesel v. Jardine Mining Co., 110 Mont. 82, 100 P.2d 75 (1940); Hull v. Hercules
Powder Co., 20 N.J. Misc. 168, 26 A.2d 164 (1942); Robison v. State, 263 App. Div. 240,
32 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1942).
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was injured on the job was negligently treated by her chiropractor-
employer. The court held that when the employer decided to treat the
industrial injury, the employment relationship terminated, and the
nurse was allowed to maintain the tort action?'
When the negligent aggravation worsens an injury or condition
unrelated to the employment, problems have arisen from attempts by
workers to recover in tort. The decisions are not altogether clear as to
whether such harm is within or without compensation coverage. Two
leading cases have held that the employee's exclusive remedy is under
workmen's compensation. In Dudley v. Victor Lynn Lines, Inc.," a
truck driver complained of a cold when he reported to work. Later that
morning, after driving from New Jersey to Manhattan, he became very
ill. His helper called one of the home terminal managers, who said he
would send help. The driver's wife, notified by the helper, also called
the manager, who assured her he would take care of everything. In
fact, nothing was done, and shortly afterward the driver died. After a
determination that the cause of death was a non-work-connected heart
attack, the widow brought a tort action against the employer. The
Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the employer's failure to furnish
medical aid after promising to do so constituted negligence at common
law, and that this negligence caused the employee's death. However,
the court went on to postulate that the negligent conduct on the part of
the employer arose out of the employment, so that the widow's exclu-
sive remedy was under workmen's compensation. Bauer v. Mesta
Mach. Co.''' involved an employee who while on the job suffered a
heart attack which did not arise out of his employment. A male nurse
employed by defendant permitted him to remain in the company dis-
pensary for two hours without calling a doctor, even though he com-
plained of increasing chest pain, vomited freely and exhibited other
signs of some serious ailment. Shortly thereafter, the employee died
from a coronary occlusion. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania sus-
tained a demurrer to an action in trespass against the employer, and
held that the negligence of the employer in not providing proper medi-
cal care constituted an "industrial accident." In both cases, claimants
were required to show negligence on the part of the employer before
they could recover under workmen's compensation." On the other
hand, in Volk v. City of New York," a nurse who became sick because of
something she ate while on duty and was injected with a decomposed
79 Duprey v. Shane, 238 P.2d 1071 (Cal, Dist. Ct. App. 1952), aff'd on rehearing,
241 P.2d 78 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952), aff'd, 39 Cal. 2d 781, 249 P.2d 8 (1952).
80 32 N.J. 479, 161 Aid 479 (1960), reversing, 48 N.J. Super. 457, 138 A.2d 53
(1958).
81 393 Pa. 380, 143 A.2d 12 (1958), 405 Pa. 617, 176 A.2d 684 (1962).
82 See Comment, 15 Rutgers L. Rev. 366, 369 (1961).
83 284 N.Y. 279, 30 N.E.2d 596 (1940).
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morphine solution at the nurses' infirmary, was permitted to sue her
employer in tort. The court held that since her work did not increase
the risk of the particular injury she suffered, the compensation act was
inapplicable. A similar result has been reached in a suit under the
Federal Tort Claims Act by a civilian government secretary who was
improperly admitted to a government hospital for treatment of varicose
veins and was injured by medical malpractice.'
A closely related line of cases are those in which the employer
maintains a clinic, discovers by X-ray the existence of some non-
industrial disease in an employee, and then negligently fails to disclose
to the employee the existence of the disease. Tort actions are usually
brought against the employer for the negligent aggravation of the em-
ployee's ailment. In some of these decisions no mention was made of
the compensation act, presumably because it was not argued as cover-
ing the injury, and the employer was held for the breach of a common
law duty to warn plaintiff of his condition." In Tourville v. United
Aircraft Corp.," the Connecticut Workmen's Compensation Act was
held to be the exclusive remedy for the aggravation of a non-occupa-
tional disease due to the employer's failure to warn the employee of
tubercular symptoms disclosed by X-rays taken at the plant hospital.
A New York trial court, when faced with a similar fact situation, per-
mitted a tort action against an employer," and an action for negligent
failure to disclose tubercular symptoms was held maintainable under
the Federal Tort Claims Act after plaintiff's claim for compensation
was denied under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act."
This temptation to bring tort actions when a non-work injury has
been negligently aggravated is considerable, although there is the danger
that if these cases are taken out of the compensation acts, then by the
same token compensation must be denied to workers whose condition is
aggravated without fault. There is risk, for example, that further harm
from an industrial injury may occur despite careful treatment. The
awarding of workmen's compensation in all these cases, however, may
be justified by the proposition that the worsening of a degenerative
condition because of a work-connected event or series of events is com-
pensable, even though the original condition in no way relates to the
employment." Under this approach, it should make no difference
whether a non-work-connected heart attack was aggravated by a trip
84 Canon v. United Stales, 111 F. Supp. 162 (N.D. Cal. 1953).
85 E.g., E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Brown, 102 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1939);
Riste v. General Elec. Co., 47 Wash. 2d 680, 289 P.2d 338 (1955). See also Annot., 69
A.L.R.2d 1213 (1960).
88 262 F.2d 570 (2c1 Cir. 1959).
87 Wojcik v. Aluminum Co. of America, 18 Misc. 2d 740, 183 N.Y.S.2d 351 (Sup. Ct.
1959.)
88 Reid v. United States, 224 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1955).
89 See Horovitz, supra note 2, at 10-12.
571
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
and fall as the employee made his way to the company first-aid station;
by negligent treatment given by a company nurse; or by the failure
of a supervisory employee to call a doctor after he had promised to do
so. In the latter two instances it should not be necessary to make a
finding of common law negligence prerequisite to a holding that the
aggravation arose out of the employment. For example, in the Dudley
case, the court first postulated that the employer had a common law
duty to aid an employee stricken on the job, and then held that the
breach of this duty satisfied the "arising-out-of" requirement of the
compensation statute. It is suggested that in relating the employment
to the aggravation, the claimant be obliged to show merely that the
work-connected condition or conditions substantially contributed to
the ultimate disability. The court in Dudley posed a hypothetical case
of a coal miner who suffered a non-industrial heart attack while deep
in a mine shaft, and died because of the inaccessibility of medical aid.'
Under the proposed approach the miner's death would be compensable.
Likewise, the failure of an employer to bring aid after promising to do
so in a state which recognizes no common law duty on the part of em-
ployers to offer help to stricken employees might result in a compen-
sable injury. Claimant need prove only that the employer's failure to
provide the promised aid was causally related to the harm for which
he seeks workmen's compensation. The same line of reasoning may
also be used to justify an award of compensation in the X-ray cases.
Also, in the cases dealing with aggravation by treatment administered
by company nurses or doctors, claimants should be required to estab-
lish merely that the treatment substantially contributed to their
worsened condition, and should be relieved of the burden of proving
common law malpractice. The maintenance of a first-aid station, the
furnishing of chest X-rays, and even the volunteering of medical help
all fail under the general heading of gratuities supplied by the em-
ployer and ultimately redounding to the benefit of the employer by
virtue of more efficient plant operation and personnel relations. This
suggested approach affords a rational basis for the disposition of these
cases, and in addition avoids an injection of tort principles into work-
men's compensation.
Another problem in the "arising-out-of" area is illustrated by
Dolan v. Linton's Lune/1, 9' in which an employee was attacked by a
fellow worker. Dolan sued his employer in tort for failing to provide a
safe place to work, and because the compensation statute specifically
exempted from coverage injuries caused by assaults perpetrated by
co-employees and motivated by personal reasons, the suit was per-
mitted. The view that privately motivated assaults per se should be
90 Dudley v. Victor Lynn Lines, Inc., 32 N.J. at 487, 161 A.2d at 486 (1960).
91 397 Pa. 114, 152 A.2d 887 (1959).
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excluded from compensation coverage fails to take into account the fact
that the employment might still substantially contribute to the injuries
in these cases.' Also, there is something anomalous in barring these
cases from workmen's compensation and then allowing a tort action
based on the failure to provide a safe place to work. A more logical
approach was followed in a recent Nevada case involving a cocktail
waitress in a Las Vegas casino who was shot while at work. She brought
a tort action against her employer, who claimed that the injury was
covered under workmen's compensation. The court, in reversing a
summary judgment for the employer, held that it was a question of fact
whether the waitress was injured because of who she was or where she
was.' If the latter were found to be true, the compensation act would
apply.
The "course-of-employment" test presents another area of judicial
interpretation which is often the subject of dispute. To determine
the inclusiveness of a compensable event, a tripartite test is applied.
The injury must arise (1) within the time limits of the job, (2) within
the space limits of the job, and (3) during an activity whose purpose is
connected with the employment."
With respect to the first requirement, workers whose employment
terminated under less than agreeable circumstances, e.g., a fight with
the foreman, have on occasion attempted to sue the employer in tort for
injuries sustained during the scuffle. However, the rule that a dis-
charged employee has a reasonable time to leave the premises before he
is considered not in the course of his employment has been used to hold
the compensation act exclusive." A similar reasonable time test is
applied in cases of injuries occurring after an employee arrives on the
business premises but before he actually commences work. One such
case involved a woman employee who, after donning her work clothes
in a company lounge, fell and injured herself while walking downstairs
to punch in on the time clock. In a tort action for damages, the court
in applying the test found for the employer."
Cases involving the space limits of a job turn on the court's view
of how far from the employment premises a worker may go before he
loses the protection of the compensation act." On the other band, in
02 See 1 Larson § 11.23; cf. Williams v. United States Cas. Co., 145 So. 2d 592 (La.
App. 1962).
93 McColl v. Scherer, 73 Nev. 226, 315 P.2d 807 (1957).
94 1 Larson § 14.
95 Peterson v. Moran, 111  Cal. App. 2d 766, 245 P.2d 540 (1952); Gardner v. Stout,
342 Mo. 1206, 119 S.W.2d 790 (1938) ; McCune v. Rhodes-Rhyne Mfg. Co., 217 N.C.
351, 8 S.E.2d 219 (1940); cf. Perry v. Beverage, 121 Wash. 652, 209 Pac. 1102 (1922).
96 Gordon v. Arden Farms Co., 53 Wash. 2d 41, 330 P.2d 561 (1958).
97 Compare Lawson v. Village of Hazelwood, 356 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. App. 1962)
(sidewalk leading to parking lot) and Wilburn v. Boeing Airplane Co., 188 -Kan. 722,
366 P.2d 246 (1961) (street adjacent to plant) with Vardzel v. Dravo Corp., 402 Pa.
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respect to the third requirement, if an activity benefits the employer
directly or indirectly, it is considered to be in the course of the employ-
ment despite the fact that it is unrelated to the particular task an em-
ployee was hired to perform." Thus, whether or not tort actions are
allowed will depend upon a finding of employer benefit or lack
thereof."
A further requirement of compensation acts is that monetary bene-
fits under workmen's compensation be calculated on the basis of econom-
ic incapacity (either actual or presumed). 1" It is well settled that an in-
dustrial injury which does not economically disable a worker, yet
inflicts upon him harm such as pain, impotency or disfigurement, may
not form the basis of a tort suit against the employer.'" A similar re-
sult has been reached in tort actions where the worker seeks recovery
for a degree of disability which is not statutorily compensable. 102 Since
workmen's compensation was intended to be the exclusive remedy for
all work-connected injuries, these decisions cannot be faulted, and any
resulting inequities are curable only through legislative change.
Various exemptions relating to employment status have been
written into the compensation acts.'" When plaintiff does not qualify
as defendant's employee under the statute, the exclusivity provisions
of the act will not bar the suit.' A notable aspect of this fringe area
is the effort made in some cases to nullify the employment relationship
on grounds of illegality. Perhaps the most extreme example is the un-
successful attempt of a taxi driver who, in suing the employer in tort,
argued his employment came to an end because of illegality when he
drove his cab faster than the speed limit. 105 The courts have on the
whole been unreceptive to these contentions, which could also be used
19,. 165 A.2d 622 (1960) (parking lot) and Wicks v. Cuneo-Henneberry Co., 319
344, 150 N.E. 276 (1925) (public sidewalk outside plant). 	 .
98 I Larson § 20.10.
99 Compare Brooks v. Dee Realty Co., 72 N.J. Super. 499, 178 Aid 644 (1962), and
Daniels v. Krey Packing Co., 346 S.W.2d 78 (Mo. 1961) with Lyday v. Holloway, 293
P.2d 348 (Okla. 1956).
too See generally, 2 Larson §§ 57.00-58.32.
101 E.g., Shaw v. Salt River Valley Water Users Ass'n, 69 Ariz. 309, 213 P.2d 378
(1950) ; Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409, 35 N.W.2d 719 (1949) ; Hyett v. North-
western Hosp., 147 Minn. 413, 180 N.W. 552 (1920). A number of compensation
statutes expressly provide for cash benefits for disfigurement. See 2 Larson § 65.30.
102 See 2 Larson § 65.40.
103 See 1 id. §§ 49-56.
104 E.g., Edwards v. Hollywood Canteen, 160 P.2d 94 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1945),
aff'd, 27 Cal. 2d 802, 167 P.2d 729 (1946) (patriotic volunteer) ; Scott v. Many Motor
Co., 140 So. 2d 778 (La. App. 1962) (casual employee; case dismissed on other grounds) ;
MacMullen v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 312 F.2d 662 (4th Cir. 1963) ; Statham v.
Blaine, 234 Miss. 649, 107 So. 2d 93 (1958) (magazine sellers). But see Dobbins v. S.A.F.
Farms, Inc., 137 So. 2d 838 (Fla. App. 1962) ; Carraway Methodist Hosp. v. Pitts, 256 Ala.
665, 57 So. 2d 96 (1952).
105 Plick v. Toye Bros. Auto & Taxicab Co., 13 La. App. 525, 127 So. 59 (1930).
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against an employee whose injury was not caused by the employer's
negligence.'"
Where adverse judicial precedents bar recovery under workmen's
compensation, the injured worker has little recourse other than to
attempt a recovery from his employer in tort. For example, the Penn-
sylvania compensation statute has been interpreted as excluding com-
pany parking lot injuries from coverage on the ground that such harm
does not arise in the course of employment.'" Hence an employee
whose injuries were sustained in the company parking lot has been
permitted to bring a negligence action against his employer.'"
However, if the case is one of first impression, by bringing a tort
action rather than a compensation claim, a worker risks making bad
compensation law. As an illustration, consider the Kansas case of the
pistol range instructor who suffered loss of hearing from his constant
exposure to loud noises. The progressive view is that gradual injury
from such exposures constitutes a "personal injury by accident."'"
But since the Kansas court had never passed on this question, the em-
ployee chose to sue his employer in tort, arguing, from what would
normally be the employer's point of view, that gradual injuries were
not covered by workmen's compensation. The court applied the liberal
rule of construction to the phrase "personal injury by accident," and
held that the worker's exclusive remedy was under the compensation
act.' Despite such results, claimants' counsel should not be criticized
in these cases, for their function is not to make good compensation law,
but to secure the best possible recovery for their clients. What then
can be said for the desirability of a double standard? Under the settled
rule of construction that compensation acts should be broadly and lib-
erally interpreted in favor of the injured worker, may a court point to
the humanitarian purposes of the statute to justify a finding that a par-
ticular injury was not work-connected, and that the worker might
bring a tort action against his employer?
In Scott v. Pacific Coast Borax Co."' plaintiff was working on the
6:00 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. shift at a hotel and coffee shop. He stayed on
the premises after work to perform tasks unrelated to his employment.
At 5:00 p.m. a co-employee on the afternoon shift asked plaintiff to help
1 °8 See 1 Larson § 47.53.
107 Eberle v. Union Dental Co., 390 Pa. 112, 134 A.2d 559 (1957) ; Young v. Hamil-
ton Watch Co., 158 Pa. Super. 448, 45 A,2d 261 (1946).
1 °8 Vardzel v. Dravo Corp., 402 Pa. 19, 165 A.2d 622 (1960).
100 See 1 Larson § 39.10; see also Shipman v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 105
Ga. App. 487, 125 S.E.2d 72 (1962).
110 Winkelman v. Boeing Airplane Co., 166 Kan. 503, 203 P.2d 171 (1949). For
other examples of good compensation law made in negligence actions brought by em-
ployees, see Carraway Methodist Hosp. v. Pitts, supra note 104; Dobbins v. S.A.F.
Farms, Inc., supra note 104; King v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 256 F.2d 812 (8th Cir.
1958).
111 140 Cal. App. 2d 173, 294 P.2d 1039 (1956).
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him repair a gasoline pump. While rendering assistance, the pump ex-
ploded and plaintiff was injured. His tort action against the employer
was dismissed, the court holding that the compensation act was plain-
tiff's exclusive remedy. In support of its construction of the compensa-
tion statute, the court, echoing the sentiments expressed in similar de-
cisions,'" stated:
Though it may be more opportunistic for a particular plain-
tiff to seek to circumscribe the purview of compensation cov-
erage because of his immediate interest and advantage, the
courts must be vigilant to preserve the spirit of the act and to
prevent a distortion of its purposes.
[Tjhe rules we lay down in this particular case must be salu-
tary and consonant with the spirit and purpose of the Com-
pensation Act, since they will govern other cases where the
Act will provide the worker disabled by industrial injury with
his sole remedy.'la
On the other hand, in Summer v. Victor Chem. Works,'" an em-
ployee suffered an industrial injury from exposure to phosphorous
fumes. His employer had elected not to be covered by the Montana
Occupational Disease Act. Bringing an action in tort, the employee
urged that his injury was compensable only under the Occupational
Disease Act, and since the employer had rejected coverage, a common
law action could be maintained. The employer argued that plaintiff's
remedy was under the Montana Workmen's Compensation Act, which
should be construed broadly to cover disability from occupational dis-
eases not compensable under the Occupational Disease Act. The court
rejected the employer's plea for a "broad" interpretation of the acts,
and held that the employee might sue the employer in tort. It is pos-,
sible to rationalize this attitude as encouraging employers to elect cov-
erage under the Occupational Disease Act. Raising the same issue,
Desousa v. Panama Canal Co."' involved an employee who had to ride
to work on a train operated by his employer. Injured in a derailment,
he sued his employer in tort, claiming that he had purchased ordinary,
second-class tickets. The employer contended that he was riding on a
special commuter pass, and that since transportation to the job was fur-
nished by the employer, the trip was thereby in the course of the em-
ployment. Hence the employer argued that as a matter of law, under a
112 See Carraway Methodist Hosp. v. Pitts, supra note 104; Freire v. Matson Nay.
Co., 19 Cal. 2d 8, 118 P.2d 809 (1941) ; Wilburn v. Boeing Airplane Co., supra
note 97; Winkelman v. Boeing Airplane Co., supra note 110.
113 Supra note 111, at 178, 184, 294 P.2d at 1043, 1046.
114 298 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1961).
115 202 F. Supp. 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
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broad construction of the statute, the Federal Employees' Compensa-
tion Act was plaintiff's exclusive remedy. The court observed that it
would be "patently unjust" to apply broad rules of compensation cov-
erage in the case, and in denying the employer's motion for a summary
judgment, held that there was an issue of fact as to whether plaintiff
had been in the course of his employment when he was injured. Finally,
some sort of a double standard seems to have evolved in the Kansas
decisions which have allowed illegally employed minors both to sue the
employer for negligence and to recover workmen's compensation.'"
But here the courts may have been expressing a strong policy of pro-
tecting minors in industry.
Clearly untenable is the notion that there be two sets of interpreta-
tions for the substantive provisions of the compensation statutes, the
one applicable when the worker seeks compensation benefits and the
other designed for use when the worker sues his employer in tort. Be-
cause of the firm underlying policy that workmen's compensation pro-
vides recovery for all industrial injuries, the concern of the courts to
formulate broad rules of coverage without regard to the interests of an
individual worker who might be better off suing his employer in tort
is well taken.
Yet in some instances, a court need not close its eyes completely to
the merits of allowing the employee to sue at common law. Policy
grounds, which might explain Summer"7 and the Kansas cases on
illegally employed minors,'" present one justification for leaning toward
the non-applicability of compensation coverage. When prior, in-point
decisions deny compensation coverage for the type of injury forming
the basis of plaintiff's claim, a court would be justified in following the
restrictive statutory construction and permitting the common law suit.
The way would still be open to the court, in a subsequent claim by an
employee for workmen's compensation, to re-examine its interpreta-
tion of the act, and perhaps adopt a more liberal view. Finally, when
a close question of fact presents itself and there is very little chance
that the numerous factors involved would ever recur in another
industrial-injury case, a court could reasonably take into account the
discrepancies between tort and workmen's compensation recoveries,
and permit the common law action or submit the issue of compensation
coverage to a jury.
It should not, of course, be assumed that once the employee avoids
the compensation act, a tort recovery is assured. The decision whether
to sue in tort or file a compensation claim is fraught with potential peril.
1141 Lee v. Kansas City P.S. Co., 137 Kan. 759, 22 P.2d 942 (1933); Dressler v.
Dressler, 167 Kan. 749, 208 P.2d 271 (1949). The cases are discussed in 1 Larson
§ 47.52(b).
117 Supra note 114.
115 Supra note 116.
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Consider the Nebraska case in which a thirty-three year old employee,
diving into shallow water at a recreational lake maintained by his em-
ployer for the optional use of employees, sustained a fracture of the
sixth cervical vertebra rendering him a quadriplegic. If the injured
worker brought a compensation claim, his maximum recovery for
permanent, total disability would have been $37 a week for the first
300 weeks, $27.50 a week thereafter for the rest of his life," and full
medical benefits.' However, there is considerable controversy as to
whether, and to what extent, recreational injuries are covered by work-
men's compensation.121 Thus a compensation claim would have been
stoutly resisted, and the issue in all probability would have been taken
to the Nebraska Supreme Court. Consequently, the worker and his
counsel elected to sue in tort, alleging that the employer was negligent
in not furnishing a safe place to dive and in failing to provide adequate
warning as to the depth of the water. A jury returned a $379,500
verdict, but on appeal the judgment was reversed. 122 Not only was the
court unable to find negligence, but it concluded that plaintiff had
assumed the risk. The opinion made no mention of compensation cov-
erage, so unless the trial court made a final determination that the com-
pensation act was inapplicable, a claim for workmen's compensation
presumably might be brought. But if the issue of compensation cov-
erage had been raised on appeal, and it had been decided that plaintiff
had a cause of action in tort rather than a compensable injury, plaintiff
would have found himself in the irreconcilable position of having no
remedy for his devastating injuries."
133 U.S. Bureau of Labor Standards, Dep't of Labor, Bull. No. 161, State Workmen's
Compensation Laws 42 (May 1960).
120 Id. at 24.
121 See 1 Larson § 22.
122 Lindelow v. Peter Kiewit Sons, 174 Neb, 1, 115 N.W.2d 776 (1962).
123 The employee who brings a tort action against his employer must face up to
the perils of election. His remedy against the employer is alternative, rather than cumu-
lative. Thus, if he accepts compensation benefits, he cannot then bring a tort claim based
on the same injury. Carter v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. App. 2d 350, 298 P.2d 598 (1956) ;
Jones v. Jeffreys, 244 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951). if the employee brings a com-
pensation claim and a final decision is made that his harm was not work-connected,
this finding will be res judicata in a subsequent tort action, so that the employer will
be precluded from arguing that the compensation act is exclusive. Palm Beach Co. v.
Crum, 262 F.2d 586 (6th Cir. 1958) ; Hines v. Continental Baking Co., 334 S.W.2d 140
(Mo. App. 1960); Miller v. St. Regis Paper Co., 59 Wash. 2d 914, 374 P.2d 675 (1962),
reversing the departmental opinion, 159 Wash. Dec. 89, 366 P.2d 214 (1961). But see
Demkiw v. Briggs Mfg. Co., 347 Mich. 492, 79 N.W.2d 876 (1956); Totten v. Detroit
Aluminum & Brass Corp., 344 Mich. 414, 73 N.W.2d 882 (1955). Likewise, a
judicial determination that the exclusivity provisions of the compensation statute required
the dismissal of a tort action brought by a worker against his employer is binding upon
the compensation tribunal in any subsequent proceedings. Garrigus v. Kerns, 130 Ind.
App. 133, 178 N.E.2d 212 (1961). See also Scott v. I.A.C., 46 Cal. 2d 76, 293 P.2d
18 (1956), vacating 283 P.2d 323 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955). The subject is treated
exhaustively in 84 A.L.R.2d 1036 (1962).
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CONCLUSION
As long as benefit levels remain inadequate and gaps in coverage
exist, workers will continue in their efforts to sue employers in tort
whenever possible. Improvements in the compensation statutes can
serve to diminish these suits, and thus reduce not only the possibility
of an injured worker being left without a remedy because of an un-
favorable holding on the issue of the employer's negligence, but also
the risk of judicial decisions preventing recovery under workmen's com-
pensation when the injury occurs through no fault of the employer.
The attacks on the exclusivity provisions of the compensation acts
reflect a discontent with the present state of workmen's compensation,
and present a challenge to the fundamental premise that all work in-
juries should be compensated under the acts. If genuine reform is not
forthcoming, occasional attempts to avoid compensation coverage may
be overshadowed by concerted efforts to bring about radical change in
the basic structure of our system of providing for the victims of industry.
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